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Irish	border	backstop:	many	unanswered	questions
and	considerable	economic	challenges
What	happens	to	Northern	Ireland	once	the	UK	leaves	the	European	Union	has
become	one	of	the	most	complex	issues	in	the	Brexit	negotiations.	The	problem
stems	from	the	fact	that	the	Good	Friday	Agreement	has	been	interpreted	as
precluding	a	return	to	a	hard	border	–	that	is,	any	physical	infrastructure	–	between
the	North	and	South	of	the	island	of	Ireland.		Billy	Melo	Araujo	(right)	and	Federico
Lupo	Pasini	(Queen’s	University	Belfast)	write	that	the	so-called	backstop	option
that	is	currently	on	the	table	is	an	imperfect	solution	that	needs	further	work.	They
conclude	that	many	many	unanswered	questions	persist	and	considerable	challenges	may	still	arise	from	that
solution,	especially	economic	ones.	
The	lack	of	a	hard	border	with	the	Republic	of	Ireland	seems	incompatible	with	some	of	the	central	goals,	as
identified	by	the	British	government,	of	Brexit.	The	UK	wishes	to	leave	the	customs	union	so	that	it	can	carry	out	its
own	independent	trade	policy	and	negotiate	its	trade	agreement	and	it	also	wishes	to	leave	the	single	market	to
deviate	from	EU	rules.	However,	leaving	the	customs	union	and	the	single	market	would	inevitably	mean	that	border
checks	would	be	required	to,	for	example,	collect	tariffs	and	check	regulatory	compliance.
How	to	square	such	clearly	irreconcilable	goals	has	occupied	much	of	time	and	attention	of	Brexit	negotiators.	In
December	2017,	the	EU	and	UK	issued	a	Joint	Report	outlining	the	progress	of	the	Brexit	negotiations	where	they
set	out	three	potentially	solutions	to	Irish	border	conundrum.	The	first	solution	would	be	for	the	border	issue	to	be
resolved	in	the	framework	of	a	future	EU-UK	trade	agreement.	The	second	option	would	be	for	the	issue	to	resolve
through	specific	solutions.	The	third	option	would	require	the	UK	to	commit	to	align	itself	with	EU	customs	and
internal	market	rules.	This	last	option	is	typically	referred	as	the	‘back-stop	option’	and	would	be	the	last	resort
scenario	that	would	only	apply	in	case	the	first	two	options	do	not	work	and
For	the	first	option	to	achieve	the	goal	of	avoiding	a	hard	border,	it	would	effectively	require	the	UK	to	stay	in	the
customs	union	and	the	single	market.	This	would,	of	course,	be	politically	a	hard	sell	for	the	current	UK	government.
The	second	option	places	much	emphasis	on	the	possibility	of	using	technology	to	obviate	the	need	for	border
controls.	The	evidence	so	far	suggests	that	whilst	technology	could	help	in	terms	of	reducing	and	facilitating	border
controls,	they	would	not	be	sufficient	to	remove	the	need	for	controls.	And	it	is	telling	that	the	main	proponent	of	the
use	of	border	technology	–	the	UK	–	has	so	far	not	been	particularly	forthcoming	with	proposals	tangible	and
workable	technological	solutions.
It	is	therefore	no	surprise	that	the	EU	has	so	far	placed	all	its	eggs	on	the	backstop	basket.	In	its	recently	published
Draft	Withdrawal	Agreement,	the	EU	included	a	Protocol	focusing	exclusively	on	Northern	Ireland	which	fleshed	out
the	contours	of	the	backstop	option.	The	proposal	is	for	Northern	Ireland	to	become	Common	Regulatory	Area	(CRA)
where	Northern	Ireland	would	continue	to	comply	with	EU	customs	rules,	the	free	movement	of	goods	and	relevant
EU	internal	market	legislation	relating	to	goods.	Should	it	come	to	fruition,	the	CRA	would	place	Northern	Ireland	in	a
unique	constitutional	and	economic	position	within	the	UK.	It	would	still	part	if	the	UK	but	it	would,	by	contrast	to	other
regions	of	the	UK,	be	able	to	maintain	the	current	unfettered	access	to	the	EU	internal	market	in	the	area	of	goods.
Some	have	viewed	the	CRA	as	providing	Northern	Ireland	with	a	special	deal	which	would	allow	it	to	keep	the	best	of
both	worlds;	continued	participation	in	the	EU	internal	market	whilst	keeping	its	foothold	in	the	UK.	Some	politicians
have	pointed	to	the	CRA	proposal	and	questioned	why	this	special	deal	which	allows	the	NI	to	effectively	stay	in	the
single	market	should	not	be	extended	other	devolved	authorities.	However,	this	reading	of	the	CRA	as	providing
Northern	Ireland	a	special,	and	perhaps	more	favourable,	deal	which	would	allow	it	to	stay	in	the	single	market	does
not	accurately	reflect	what	is	being	proposed	in	the	CRA	and	the	potential	drawbacks	it	presents	for	Northern	Ireland.
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Firstly,	the	CRA	does	not	encompass	the	entirety	of	the	single	market.	It	only	applies	to	trade	in	goods	and	only	to
those	areas	which	have	a	cross-border	trade	dimension.	Other	important	economic	sectors,	like	services,	are
excluded	from	the	scope	of	the	CRA.		Secondly,	the	CRA	does	not,	in	its	current	form,	enable	Northern	Ireland	to
maintain	the	status	quo	in	terms	the	benefits	associated	with	internal	market	membership.	For	example,	there	is
nothing	in	the	Protocol	which	indicates	that	Norther	Ireland	would	continue	to	benefit	from	the	preferential	tariff
treatment	and	market	access	provided	under	EU	Free	Trade	Agreements	(FTAs).	Indeed	EU	FTAs	typically	only
apply	to	EU	Member	States	which,	as	part	of	the	UK,	Northern	Ireland	would	not	qualify	as.		This	would	mean	that
Northern	Ireland	could	find	itself	in	a	position	where	must	allow	unrestricted	access	goods	from	third	countries	with
whom	the	EU	has	signed	a	FTA	whilst	Northern	Ireland	goods	would	not	benefit	from	the	preferential	treatment
under	these	FTAs.	This	problem	is	further	exacerbated	by	the	fact	that	because	Northern	Ireland	would	be	subject	to
EU	customs	rules	it	would	also	not	be	covered	by	commitments	relating	to	goods	negotiated	in	future	UK	FTAs.	In
other	words,	under	the	CRA,	Northern	Ireland	could	well	find	itself	excluded	from	both	EU	and	UK	FTAs.	This	would
be	particularly	problematic	as	goods	still	account	for	the	majority	of	Northern	Irish	exports.
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Another	example	can	be	found	in	the	area	of	agricultural	subsidies.	The	farming	sector	remains	an	important	feature
of	the	Northern	Irish	economy.	One	that	is	especially	reliant	on	EU	subsidies	under	the	Common	Agricultural	Policy
(CAP).	Yet,	whilst	the	CRA	would	remove	all	barriers	to	trade	in	agricultural	products	between	Northern	Ireland	and
the	EU,	nothing	is	said	about	the	fate	of	agricultural	subsidies.	This	raises	concerns	regarding	potential	distortions	of
competition.	Unless	Northern	Ireland	farmers	continue	to	benefit	from	CAP	payments	or	in	the	absence	of	a
commitment	by	the	UK	to	match	EU	levels	of	agricultural	subsidies	to	Northern	Ireland	farmers,	the	latter	could	well
be	placed	at	significant	competitive	disadvantage	compared	to	their	counterparts	in	the	south	of	the	island.
There	are	also	important	questions	relating	to	the	constitutional	operation	of	the	CRA.	The	CRA	provides	that
Northern	Ireland	will	have	to	comply	with	relevant	EU	law	and	that	the	Court	of	Justice	of	the	European	Union	shall
have	jurisdiction	over	issues	falling	within	the	scope	of	the	Protocol.	But	no	clarity	is	provided	with	respect	to	the
relation	between	the	EU	and	the	Northern	Ireland	legal	order.	Will	provisions	of	EU	law	have	direct	effect	in	Northern
Ireland	(that	is,	can	they	be	invoked	by	individuals	directly	before	domestic	courts)	and	will	the	principle	of
supremacy	of	EU	law	continue	to	apply?
The	backstop	option	proposed	by	the	EU	has	clear	merits.	The	most	obvious	one	is	that	it	obviates	the	need	for	a
return	to	a	hard	border	within	the	island	of	Ireland,	a	key	component	of	the	peace	process	in	Northern	Ireland.	Its
importance	should	not	be	dismissed	or	underestimated.	But	the	current	proposals	for	a	CRA	leave	a	lot	of
unanswered	questions	and	present	a	number	of	considerable	challenges	for	the	Northern	Ireland	economy.	These
questions	must	be	addressed,	as	a	matter	of	urgency,	if	the	CRA	is	not	to	cause	significant	adverse	consequences	to
the	economy	of	Northern	Ireland.
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Finally,	there	is	the	uncomfortable	question	of	what	happens	to	trade	between	Northern	Ireland	and	the	rest	of	the
UK.	Great	Britain	remains	the	largest	export	destination	for	Northern	Irish	goods.	An	inevitable	consequence	of
Northern	Ireland	being	subject	to	EU	customs	and	single	market	rules	is	that	barriers	will	be	erected	to	‘East-West’
trade.	This	would	be	politically	problematic	for	the	UK	government	(in	light	of	its	commitment	to	maintain	Northern
Ireland	within	the	UK’s	internal	market)	and	would	come	at	a	considerable	economic	cost	for	Northern	Ireland.
This,	of	course,	is	a	domestic	issue	rather	than	one	that	could	be	solved	by	the	EU.	The	only	realistic	solution	would
be	for	the	UK,	as	a	whole	to	stay	in	the	customs	union	and	the	single	market	for	goods.	And	that	would	bring	us	back
to	square	one.
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